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Abstract
This paper studies bribery between a firm and a supervisor who monitors the firm
for regulatory compliance. Bribery occurs preemptively, that is before the supervisor
exerts costly effort to discover the firms level of non-compliance and collect evidence for
successful prosecution. In contrast to previous papers, preemptive bribery is modeled
as a Bayesian signaling game because the supervisor is uninformed about the firms
level of non-compliance. We show that under normal informational assumptions, some
(possibly all) firms always engage in preemptive bribery. However, if knowledge of
the firms level of non-compliance has implications for the supervisors ability to collect
evidence and prosecute, preemptive bribery can be completely eliminated. Results
which apply to preemptive bribery under complete information do not apply here.
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1 Introduction
It is well recognized that corruption and bribery undermine enforcement in various regulatory
settings. In particular, collusion between the supervisor who is in charge of enforcement, and
the agent who is being regulated, dilutes enforcement. However, bribery is often undertaken
in highly uncertain environments with incomplete information. These informational consid-
erations can put natural limits on the nature and scope of bribery, for example, because
the briber does not know which official to bribe or how much to offer. Empirically using
cross-country data, Lambsdorff (2007) finds that uncertainty regarding the size of the bribe
can reduce corruption. However, a theoretical explanation for why incomplete information
places limits on bribery has not been precisely established. This is largely because most of
the literature assumes that bribery occurs under complete information. Thus, the objective
of this paper is to examine the impact of these informational considerations on the likelihood
of bribery. Further, we wish to examine whether the regulator can safely ignore certain types
of bribery because asymmetric information makes these unlikely to occur.
To achieve our objective, we consider a model of preemptive bribery where bribery can
occur before the supervisor has carried out inspections and the supervisor is relatively un-
informed about the firm (agent). Although there is a sizeable literature on corruption and
enforcement, most of the focus is on ex post bribery; that is, collusion which takes place
after the supervisor has collected evidence regarding the firm’s non-compliance.1 Mookherjee
and Png (1995), for example, provide a detailed analysis of the conditions under which ex
post bribery will occur and how it must be deterred (see also Polinksy and Shavell, 2001).
Distinguishing between ex post and preemptive bribery is important for our project because
incomplete information does not have strategic significance for ex post bribery since the
supervisor is supposed to have conducted the inspection and therefore is in possession of
evidence. The supervisor might still be uninformed about certain aspects, but the complete
information set up is not highly restrictive.
In contrast, with preemptive collusion the supervisor accepts a bribe in order to not carry
out any inspection (Bac 1998, Bag 1997, Motta 2009, and Samuel 2009), therefore, it is more
likely to be sensitive to informational considerations and assumptions. Indeed, preemptive
bribery differs from ex post bribery in two crucial aspects, which complicates the analysis
of its incentives and deterrence. First, preemptive bribery is more likely to occur because
1Empirically preemptive bribery is quite common. See Barron and Olken (2009) for an example where
both ex post and ex ante bribery take place in the trucking industry.
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the coalition of the firm and the supervisor saves on the inspection costs by engaging in
preemptive bribery. Further, because hard evidence has not been gathered, there is no risk of
that evidence “leaking” and being used to prosecute the firm and the supervisor in the future.
Second, as we have discussed, preemptive bribery takes place with a relatively uninformed
supervisor who does not know the extent of the firm’s non-compliance. In this scenario, a firm
may be unwilling to bribe the supervisor, because the bribe may signal information about
the extent to which the firm is non-compliant. Arguably then, this asymmetric information
may be sufficient to disrupt the bargaining process, thereby, preventing preemptive bribery
from occurring. Given that avoiding costly evidence gathering encourages preemptive bribery,
while incomplete information discourages it, we wish to examine how these two effects impact
the incidence of preemptive bribery in equilibrium. To our knowledge ours is the first attempt
at fully understanding the implications of asymmetric information for preemptive bribery.
To achieve this goal, we develop a model of bribery in a regulatory setting where polluting
firms can be either low waste or high waste firms. Different levels of waste attract different
mandated fines. The government hires a supervisor who can easily observe whether a firm
is non-polluting or polluting, but cannot distinguish between low and high waste firms.2
To distinguish between low and high waste firms, the supervisor must exert costly effort
to gather evidence regarding the firm’s waste level. Conditional on successfully obtaining
evidence, the supervisor is required to report this waste level to the regulator who imposes
a fine on the firm based on this report. In the absence of any evidence, a firm is treated as
a non-polluting firm by the legal process. We assume that supervisors are corruptible and
may accept a bribe in exchange for not reporting the firm’s level of waste to the regulator.
If bribery occurs preemptively, the supervisor accepts a bribe in exchange for not gathering
evidence regarding the firm’s type. The supervisor can commit to not investigate and seek
hard information or evidence.
Unlike ex post bribery, preemptive bribery occurs before the supervisor observes whether
the firm’s actual type is known. Therefore, we set up the preemptive bribe game as a signaling
game where firms offer bribes to the supervisor and the size of the bribe can potentially signal
the firm’s type. Using the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium we determine whether
preemptive bribery can occur in equilibrium. As is well known, signaling games admit a
plethora of equilibria, therefore, we characterize the entire set of (Bayesian Nash) equilibria
2This information structure is often used to capture the hierarchy of information. The firm has the finest,
the supervisor has a coarser and the regulator has the coarsest information structure. For example, see Celik
(2009).
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of this game. Although we identify several equilibria, we show that there exists a unique
(separating) equilibrium which satisfies standard refinement criteria. In this equilibrium, high
waste and low waste firms offer different bribes which are accepted with different probabilities.
As a result, high waste types always engage in preemptive bribery and escape prosecution, low
waste types are sometimes prosecuted. Thus, our first result is that informational asymmetry
has limited deterrence and the presence of asymmetric information alone is not sufficient to
prevent preemptive collusion completely.
Nevertheless, the standard signaling framework does not fully capture the informational
complexities of preemptive bribery. Specifically, in many cases the preemptive bribing pro-
cess can reveal some information about the firm’s level of waste, and this information can
make the supervisor’s investigation more effective at a later stage in the game. If high and
low waste firms offer a separating bribe, then since the bribe signals the firm’s type, posses-
sion of this “soft” information signal may make it easier for the supervisor to subsequently
gather hard evidence. To illustrate this intuition in a related context; a detective who knows
he is investigating a “small time crook” may choose to carry out his investigation differently
than if he knows he is going after a large, organized, gang. Thus, soft information regarding
the criminals type (small or large) can make subsequent evidence gathering more effective.3
In such a case, informational asymmetries will affect the incidence of preemptive bribery. In
this case also the supervisor can commit to ‘no-investigation’ after accepting a bribe, but
unlike the previous case, he is unable to commit to not using the soft information gained in
the process of bribe negotiations.
Given this intuition, we extend our basic model above to allow for the possibility that
“knowledge” of a firm’s type makes it easier for the supervisor to collect evidence for prose-
cuting the firm. This possibility, which we identify as the prior knowledge condition, affects
the preemptive bribery game significantly. Indeed, under this condition, preemptive bribery
can be eliminated completely in the sense that there exists an equilibrium in which neither
type successfully engages in preemptive bribery. Thus our paper shows that whether infor-
mational asymmetries reduce the feasibility of preemptive bribery, depends largely on whether
“soft” information obtained through a signal can be utilized by the supervisor to make the
subsequent investigation more effective.4
3Likewise, in certain cases a ‘confession’ to a certain crime may not be admissible evidence, but it can be
useful to the inspector in gathering hard evidence.
4The basic idea is relevant in other contexts. For example, the informational structure of this game is
similar to models of settlement and trial where only the plaintiff knows the true level of damages and makes
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In addition, our comparative static results with and without the prior knowledge condi-
tion also differ from standard models of preemptive bribery (Bac 1998). Specifically, in the
previous literature an increase in the cost of inspection effort, or in the probability of detec-
tion raise the likelihood of preemptive bribery. In our model with incomplete information,
however, an increase in the cost of effort raises the frequency of preemptive bribery among
low polluting firms, but an increase in the probability of detection reduces the likelihood of
preemptive bribery among low types. But these parameters have no affect on the likelihood
of bribery among high polluting firms. With the prior knowledge condition, we find that
preemptive bribery can be eliminated entirely, and once it is eliminated, small changes in
these parameters will have no impact on the likelihood of preemptive bribery. Our model,
therefore, suggests that the informational structure of the bribe game cannot be ignored
when trying to understand the impact of these policy parameters.
The prior knowledge framework that we propose and the results that follow from it,
illuminate the value of carefully accounting for the informational context in which bribery
operates. These results are, therefore, related to the existing literature as to whether a
principal can deter collusion (in other contexts) by introducing asymmetric information.
Kofman and Lawarree (1996), study a principal who hires two supervisors to inspect the
same firm sequentially. They show that if each supervisor does not know for certain whether
she is the first or the second to inspect the firm, collusion can deterred.5 Motta (2009)
studies preemptive bribery under asymmetric information in a model of tax evasion. In
his model the supervisor only knows the distribution of incomes, but not the income of
an individual tax payer. Therefore, in contrast to our paper where the preemptive bribe
may differ according to the level of compliance and may signal the level of compliance,
in his paper the supervisor chooses a single (screening) preemptive bribe that maximizes
the overall gains from preemptive bribery. Thus, in his paper preemptive bribery does not
provide any information regarding the tax payer’s type, and consequently, none of the key
findings regarding preemptive bribery under perfect information are altered by the presence
of asymmetric information. Our work is also related to Ryvkin and Serra (2012) who study
bribery within the context of bureaucrats who illegally provide a public good in exchange
for a bribe. In their model bribery takes place under incomplete information because an
a settlement demand based on the true level of damages (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986). The defendant infers
the plaintiffs true damage level, and must decide whether to settle or let the case go to trial.
5Note that in their paper asymmetric information is between multiple supervisors whereas in our model
it is between the supervisor and the agent.
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individual’s moral cost of paying or accepting a bribe is unknown.6 Bribery, in their set
up, is modeled as a double auction, following the model of bargaining under asymmetric
information due to Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). They show that relative to the case
with complete information, corruption is less likely to occur under incomplete information
because bribe payers under-bid, and bribe takers over-bid, relative to the true value they
are willing to pay (accept). Finally, more recently, Chassang and Ortner (2014) have shown
that the principal can create and use asymmetric information between the supervisor and
the agent as a counter-corruption measure. The principal can randomize the incentives given
to the supervisor, the realized value being unknown to the agent, and make side-contracting
between the supervisor and the agent more difficult.
In contrast to all these papers, our focus is on understanding how the bribing process
itself reveals some information about the firm’s level of non-compliance, and whether this can
in turn influence the effectiveness of inspections. That is, in some sense our prior knowledge
condition allows for the possession of “soft information” to make it easy to subsequently
collect “hard” information.7 In this sense our paper is related to Khalil, Lawaree, and Yun
(2010) who study the role of hard and soft information on bribery and extortion. They
assume that information is “hard” when the supervisor acts alone, but becomes “soft” for
the supervisor-firm coalition because they collude to fabricate evidence. In our model hard
information (or evidence) arises as a consequence of successful evidence gathering, and this
evidence gathering is easier if the supervisor possesses soft information.
Besides offering a careful analysis of the informational issues concerning preemptive
bribery, our model also explains some empirical patterns regarding preemptive bribery.
Specifically, recent empirical findings by Babu et.al. (2012) suggest that smaller clients
are prosecuted more often, while larger clients are able to bribe their way out of being
prosecuted. In our model high polluting firms are always able to separate themselves from
low polluting firms, and are never prosecuted. Similarly, Lubin’s (2003) analysis of bribery
among drug smugglers in Afghanistan finds that “big time” smugglers are more likely to pay
preemptive bribes while petty smugglers get apprehended more frequently. Models of pre-
emptive bribery with complete information do not fully explain this particular phenomenon
6Our paper is also related to the literature on crime and asymmetric information. For e.g. Marjit, Rajeev,
and Mookherjee (2000) show that lack of knowledge about a criminal’s type, can weaken the law-enforcer’s
incentive to exert costly investigative effort.
7Hard information refers to information that is (costlessly) verifiable by third parties (see Baliga (1999),
Tirole (1992) for a discussion of this issue)
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associated with preemptive collusion. However, in our framework we find that the only equi-
librium in which bribery occurs is one where the smaller criminals are sometimes prosecuted
(and sometimes bribe), but large-scale criminals are always able to pay a bribe to avoid
being sanctioned. Thus, introducing incomplete information deepens our understanding of
this form of corruption.
Following the introduction, the second section describes the benchmark model under
complete information. The third section extends this to the incomplete information setting
to see whether bribery gets deterred. In section 4 we introduce the game with the prior
knowledge condition and discuss how preemptive bribery is affected. In section 5 we study
the effect of policy variables both with and without the prior knowledge condition, and the
final section concludes.
2 Complete Information: the Benchmark Case
Consider a model with three risk-neutral players: the principal or regulator, the supervisor,
and the firm. Normalizing the (acceptable) pollution standard to be zero, we have compliant
firms with no pollution (0) or non-compliant firms belonging to one of the following two types
(i): low-waste firms with a waste level of (l), and high-waste firms with a waste level of (h),
so that i ∈ {l, h}.8 By assumption, h > l > 0. Among the polluting firms the proportion of l
types is p (with the corresponding proportion of h types being (1−p)) and each firm knows its
type. Supervisors are hired by the regulator to investigate firms who are penalized according
to their level of waste. In the complete information set-up, the supervisor immediately
observes the firm’s pollution level, therefore, his information set is: IC = {{0}, {l}, {h}}.
For the compliant firms (with pollution level 0), there is no need for further evidence. For
the non-compliant firms, although the supervisor observes the firm type, this information is
soft and he must obtain evidence to use in his report to the regulator. By exerting costly
effort E > 0 the supervisor can, with probability µ ∈ (0, 1), obtain evidence regarding the
firm’s waste level {l, h}, and with probability (1− µ) obtains no evidence {φ}. This report is
denoted by θ, where θ ∈ {l, h}∪ {φ}. The report results in the firm being fined Fi, i = {l, h},
and the supervisor receives a reward ri ·Fi. Following the literature (Shavell 1992), we assume
Fh > Fl > 0 for the standard “marginal deterrence” reasons, fines reflecting the intensity of
8The compliant firms have no strategic role in our analysis, but overall compliance level depends on their
measure.
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the activity. Depending on the distribution of benefits, some firms may be allowed to pollute
at lower levels but not at the higher levels because the latter impose higher social costs. Note
that, similar to the fines, rewards can be conditioned on the level of pollution too. However,
to keep it simple we assume that rh = rl = r ∈ (0, 1].9 Further, we assume that firms are
not fined when the report θ = φ.10 Finally, we assume that the following condition always
holds so that we may ignore cases where E is so large (or µ so small) that the supervisor
receives a negative payoff from exerting effort to collect evidence.
µrFl − E ≥ 0 (1)
Supervisors and firms are corruptible and may choose to exchange a bribe instead of the
fine. In any given interaction between the firm and the supervisor, bribery may occur at two
stages: preemptively, that is before the supervisor has discovered the firm’s type, or ex post,
that is after the supervisor discovers the firm’s type. Under ex post bribery the supervisor
gathers evidence but submits a report θ = φ in exchange for a bribe. Thus, conditional on the
supervisor exerting E, ex post corruption can occur only with probability µ; that is only if
the supervisor finds evidence about the firm’s pollution. In contrast, with preemptive bribery
the supervisor commits not to investigate further (by not exerting effort) in exchange for a
bribe. We assume that the bribe contract is enforceable and that the supervisor can commit
to not investigate the firm after it has accepted a bribe.
Finally, unlike many models of bribery, we only focus on the use of “carrots” and not
“sticks” to prevent bribery. That is, we assume that bribery cannot be detected and penal-
ized. We make this assumption because another layer of supervision opens up the possibility
of new forms of collusion between the supervisor and those appointed to monitor the super-
visor for bribery, creating further problems in the spirit of the phrase “who will watch the
watchmen?”
Under the assumption of sequential rationality we solve for the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium of this game. First consider the ex post bribery game. Any ex post bribe B
9Clearly, r is also an instrument through which the regulator can influence the game between the firm
and the inspector. However, we find that if rl < rh < 1, then there is no qualitative change in our results.
For rl > rh it is possible to get a different set of equilibria but the no-collusion outcome cannot be sustained
with rl < 1. For example, with rlFl = rhFh, we have a unique pooling equilibrium with preemptive bribery.
10Note that extortion is not feasible in our model because of the requirement of hard evidence for any
reporting. An l type cannot be reported as an h type without evidence and we assume that evidence can
not be ‘cooked’.
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must satisfy, F > B > rF. Clearly, by raising r ≥ 1, this condition can be reversed and ex
post bribery eliminated (as discussed in Mookherjee and Png 1995). In the present context,
since we also assume r ≤ 1, this implies r = 1 which can be interpreted as the case of
privatized enforcement (Laffont and Tirole 1993).11 Alternatively, it should be noted that
there are often costs associated with ex post bribery, especially if suppression of (hard)
evidence is costly (as in Khalil, Lawaree, and Yun 2010). If suppressing evidence costs c
then r ≥ r′ = 1− (c/F ), is sufficient to eliminate ex post bribery and r need not be set equal
to 1. Thus a sufficient condition for preventing ex post collusion is,
r ≥ r′, where r′ ≤ 1. (2)
For the remainder of this paper, we shall assume that (2) is always satisfied since we are
primarily interested in the incentives for preemptive bribery. It must be noted that we are
not looking at the possible trade-offs or implications of these two forms bribery, but are
concerned with the impact of informational asymmetries on the incidence of preemptive
bribery alone.
We now turn to the game of preemptive bribery with complete information. Let GC
denote the preemptive bribery (and subsequent investigation) game. We assume that GC
follows a simple ultimatum game where the firm always makes an offer, which the supervisor
chooses to accept or reject. Although, these assumptions may appear constricting, the key
qualitative results are unlikely to be affected.12 Acceptance of the bribe offer implies that the
supervisor will not investigate the firm any further, and rejection means that the supervisor
exerts costly effort E to investigate and collect evidence (with probability µ). In the absence
of any evidence, θ = φ and the firm does not pay any fine. If evidence is obtained, then
given (2) the firm pays Fi in fines and the supervisor gets rFi. A polluting firm of type i
will, therefore, offer (µrFi − E) that will be accepted by the supervisor. Since preemptive
bribery cannot be detected, for any r ≤ 1 we have µFi(1− r) +E > 0, preemptive collusion
can not be deterred regardless of whether ex post collusion is deterred or not. Let Ui denote
11We can have r > 1 but it does not seem realistic and an unbounded r makes the model uninteresting.
Without any upper bound, it is always possible to choose a high enough r to deter all kinds of bribery,
including preemptive bribery.
12Our model implies that the firm possesses all the bargaining power. Most bribery games determine the
bribe within a Nash bargaining framework with equal bargaining power. However, this bargaining solution
cannot be extended easily to incomplete information settings. As an alternative to the above assumption,
we have considered another variant of the ultimatum game where the supervisor and the firm each make an
offer (or bribe ask) with probability .5. Qualitative results are unchanged.
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the expected payoffs to a firm of type i, and let V denote the (expected) payoffs to the
supervisor, in game GC . Equilibrium payoffs are denoted by U∗i , V
∗. We summarize the
above discussion in the following claim.
Claim: In the benchmark case with complete information, in equilibrium both types always
engage in preemptive bribery and the firm is never prosecuted, and we have,
U∗i = −[µrFi − E], i = l, h.
3 Incomplete Information and Preemptive Collusion
When the supervisor is unable to distinguish between the l and the h types, preemptive
collusion involves an uninformed supervisor. In this game with incomplete information,
the supervisor only observes whether the firm is a zero waste firm (compliant) or positive
waste firm (of type l or h). Thus, the supervisor’s information set IA now has the partition
{{0}, {l, h}}. By exerting costly effort E > 0 the supervisor can, with probability µ ∈ (0, 1),
obtain evidence regarding the firm’s waste level. Note that possession of evidence implies
knowledge of the firm’s type but the converse is not true.
The preemptive bribe game with incomplete information, which we denote by GA, is a
signaling game. In this game the polluting firm makes a bribe offer, and where p is the
supervisor’s prior belief that the firm is of type l. A firm of type i’s strategy is denoted by
the bribe offer Bi, where Bi ≥ 0, while the supervisor’s strategy is denoted by a ∈ {0, 1},
where a = 1 denotes acceptance of the bribe.13 Following a preemptive bribe offer B ∈ R+,
the supervisor updates its belief about the firm’s type, where q denotes the supervisor’s
posterior belief that the firm is of type l, q(B) = prob(i = l | B). Besides the bribe, we
assume that the supervisor does not receive any other signals. Rejection, a = 0, leads to the
supervisor putting in the required effort to collect the evidence. Let ρ(a | B) ≡ ρ(B), with
ρ : R+ −→ [0, 1], be the probability that a bribe offer B will be accepted.
We denote the game’s strategy profile as σ = (Bl, Bh, ρ(B)), and shall consider sequential
equilibria (σ∗, q˜ ) where σ∗ is sequentially rational given system of beliefs q˜, and q˜ is consistent
with σ∗, Bayes’ law, and the given prior p. First, we examine whether the no-collusion
13Since we only focus on pure strategy bribe offers by the firm, the equilibria we consider are exhaustive.
Allowing firms to randomize over different bribe introduces the possibility of other equilibria, such as semi-
separating equilibria. However, our basic results remain unchanged.
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outcome is an equilibrium (that is, whether preemptive bribery can be prevented). Then,
we consider two types of preemptive bribe equilibria: (1) pooling equilibria where both
types of firms offer the same positive bribe and the supervisor accepts the bribe, and (2)
separating equilibria where h types offer a separating bribe B∗h and the l types offer B
∗
l , and
the supervisor accepts the higher bribe from the h type while rejecting the lower bribe with
positive probability. In the separating equilibrium, there is preemptive collusion with the h
type but the l type is being investigated and penalized with positive probability.
As is well known, these games admit many equilibria which are often supported by
unreasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We use a version of the universal divinity criterion
(Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Sobel (1990)) to refine the set of equilibria. Refinement
in this context essentially eliminates types for a certain strategy B if they are unlikely to
have deviated to that strategy B (given the other players’ best response to B). We use
the following condition, denoted as D1, to refine the set of equilibria (see Fudenberg- Tirole
2000).
Consider any particular equilibrium (σ∗, q˜ ) and let U∗l , U
∗
h be the equilibrium payoffs
of the two types in the game GA. Type i will benefit from deviating to bribe offer B if
Ui(B, ρ) > U
∗
i . Let P be the set of mixed best responses by the supervisor for any beliefs q
over types. Define D(B, i) as the set of mixed best responses by the supervisor so that type
i benefits from deviating. That is,
D(B, i) = {ρ ∈ P s.t. Ui(B, ρ(B)) > U∗i }, i = l, h. (3)
Similarly, define D0(B, i) as the set of best responses by the supervisor so that type i is
indifferent between the equilibrium play and deviation to offer B. Then,
D0(B, i) = {ρ ∈ P s.t. Ui(B, ρ(B)) = U∗i }, i = l, h. (4)
Condition 1 Condition D1 requires that a type i is not considered for deviation B if ∃j 6= i
s.t.
{D(B, i) ∪D0(B, i)} ⊂ D(B, j) (5)
The condition requires that type i is not likely to have deviated to offer B if there exists
another type j such that whenever type i finds it profitable to deviate, so does type j, but
the converse is not true. An equilibrium is rejected if out of equilibrium beliefs fail to satisfy
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this condition.
3.1 Preventing collusion
Recall that in the complete information benchmark case, it is not possible to prevent preemp-
tive collusion by either type of firms, whenever r ≤ 1. In the incomplete information case,
we now show that it is possible to achieve some, but not complete, deterrence. Specifically,
it is easy to show that the no-collusion outcome, where neither type engages in preemptive
bribery, cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. We outline the logic of this claim below by
showing that strategies in which either both types offer a 0 bribe or where the supervisor
always rejects any bribe (from either type) do not constitute an equilibrium.
Let B∗l , B
∗
h refer to the equilibrium bribe offers by the two types. For the no-collusion
outcome to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that ρ∗(B∗l ) = ρ
∗(B∗h) = 0, or that
B∗l = B
∗
h = 0. First, observe that it is not rational for the supervisor to reject any bribe
offer B ≥ µrFh − E. Hence any equilibrium bribe from either type must satisfy, B∗l , B∗h <
µrFh−E. Limiting our bribes to this range, there may be pooling equilibria with B∗l = B∗h
or, a separating equilibria with B∗l < B
∗
h. However, regardless of whether it is pooling or
separating, if the no collusion outcome is an equilibrium, the payoff to the h type is µFh.
But then the h type can always deviate and offer µrFh −E which will be accepted.14 Since
r ≤ 1, it follows that µrFh − E < µFh, and such a deviation is always profitable. Thus, no
collusion cannot be an equilibrium. We summarize this analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the incomplete information environment, complete prevention of preemp-
tive bribery is not possible.
This establishes that the presence of asymmetric information in itself is not sufficient to
deter preemptive bribery. However, we shall see that compared to the benchmark case in
Section 2, there is some deterrence of preemptive bribery. We shall show that the h types
will always engage in some form of preemptive bribery in any equilibrium. The extent to
which the l types engage in bribery depends on the particular equilibrium we focus on.
14Note that this is true even if rh > rl since the high type will always be able to offer a separating bribe
and deviate.
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3.2 Preemptive bribery and limited prosecution
Clearly, game GA admits several equilibria, therefore, the nature of preemptive bribery and
whether prosecution will occur depends on the specific equilibrium. As mentioned earlier,
in this game both pooling as well as separating equilibria exist.15 In the case of pooling,
both types of firms are able to enter into preemptive collusion with the supervisor with
positive bribes Bl = Bh = B
∗ > 0, which the supervisor accepts. It should be noted
that there is in fact a multiplicity of such pooling equilibria. Any bribe B∗ such that
B ≤ B∗ < min{µFl, µrFh−E)} can be supported as an equilibrium, where B stands for the
bribe which the supervisor is indifferent between accepting and rejecting, for a given prior
belief p.
With regard to separating equilibria, as one would expect, the h types are able to offer
large enough bribe to separate from the l types. Specifically, each type offers different bribes
which are accepted with different probabilities. The most obvious separating equilibrium is
one where the l types offer zero bribe, which is rejected by the supervisor. This equilibrium
with preemptive bribery by only the h type is possible only when the marginal fine (Fh−Fl)
is quite large; µrFh−E ≥ µFl. However, as we show in the appendix, it requires beliefs that
do not satisfy the condition D1 specified earlier.
Although the above equilibrium does not satisfy refinements, there is a second separating
equilibrium which does. In this equilibrium the h types offer B∗h which is accepted with
probability 1 and the l types offer B∗l which is accepted with probability x < 1 such that the
h types are not interested in mimicking the l types. Also, this equilibrium does not depend
on whether µrFh − E ≥ µFl holds or not. We characterize the equilibrium below and show
that it is unique in the sense that it satisfies the divinity criterion stated earlier.
Consider the following equilibrium. B∗l = µrFl−E and B∗h = µrFh−E. The supervisor’s
strategy is given by,
ρ∗(B) =

1, for B ≥ B∗h
x, for B = B∗l where x =
µFh+E−µrFh
µFh+E−µrFl , 0 < x < 1
0, otherwise.
(6)
The corresponding belief system q˜ is given as follows,
15We characterize the entire set of equilibria in the Appendix. However, we do not consider mixed strategies
where firms randomizing over bribes.
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q˜(B) =
{
0, B > µrFl − E
1, otherwise.
(7)
Proposition 3 Let r ≥ r′, so that ex post collusion is not feasible. In this incomplete
information environment, there always exists an equilibrium where the h type engages in
preemptive bribery and is never prosecuted and the l type engages in bribery but is prosecuted
with positive probability 1−x; x = (µFh+E−µrFh
µFh+E−µrFl ) ∈ (0, 1). This equilibrium satisfies condition
D1.
Proof. First, note that for an x to exist such that the h type is indifferent between
mimicking the l type and separating (offering B∗l and B
∗
h) we need an x such that,
µrFh − E = x(µrFl − E) + (1− x)(µFh).
Clearly, such an x always exists since µFh > µrFh − E > µrFl − E.
With this x, it is easy to verify that the strategy profile and beliefs specified above
constitute an equilibrium.16 The h type is indifferent between offeringB∗h andB
∗
l , hence it has
no incentive to deviate. The l type does not benefit from deviation either. Any bribe below
µrFl−E will be rejected and will lead to a payoff of −(µFl) < −[x(µrFl−E) + (1−x)µFl].
Note that any offer below µrFl−E will be rejected irrespective of the belief about the types.
It can be verified that the l type will also be strictly worse off by offering any bribe B ≥
B∗h. For the supervisor, rejecting any bribe offer between µrFl −E and µrFh−E is optimal
because the supervisor believes that such offer would have come only from the h type. We
can verify that beliefs satisfy condition D1. Recall that equilibrium payoffs are
U∗h = −[µrFh − E], U∗l = −[x(µrFl − E) + (1− x)µFl]. (8)
Now consider a deviation to bribe B by the firm such that min{µFl, µrFh − E} > B >
µrFl − E. Note that we don’t need to consider deviations below µrFl − E because such
bribes will always be refused, since it is the least the supervisor gets from refusing. Similarly,
bribes which exceed µFl can only originate from the h types and bribes in excess of µrFh−E
are accepted in equilibrium. For any such deviation B we can find the set of mixed best
16To show that such a construction exists, it suffices to note that 0 < x < 1. Suppose p = 1/2, Fh =
40, Fl = 20, E = 2, µ = 3/5, r = 3/4. The h type offers 16 which is accepted, the l type offers 7 which is
accepted with probability 8/17. So the l type is prosecuted with probability 9/17.
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responses by the supervisor for which such a deviation would yield higher payoffs compared
to the equilibrium payoffs for the two different types. Using (3)-(4),
D(B, h) = {ρ ∈ P | ρ > ρh = µFh + E − µrFh
µFh −B },
D(B, l) = {ρ ∈ P | ρ > ρl = x(µFl + E − µrFl
µFl −B }, (9)
and D0(B, l) = ρl
where x =
µFh + E − µrFh
µFh + E − µrFl .
Since (ρh − ρl) = x(µFh−B)(µFl−B)(µrFl − E − B)(µFh − µFl), it is easy to see that ρh < ρl,
∀B > µrFl − E. It follows that {D(B, l) ∪ D0(B, l)} ⊂ D(B, h). Hence according to D1,
given any bribe offer in excess of µrFl−E the supervisor should believe that the offer would
have been made by the h type rather than the l type. This is what the beliefs as given in
(7) specify.
In the appendix we show that no other equilibrium satisfies condition D1 and we can
treat the above (6) as the unique equilibrium. Specifically, it shows that the l types do get
prosecuted with some probability while the h types are never prosecuted. Thus, incomplete
information, in this sense, does reduce preemptive bribery and raises prosecution. In section
5 we study the comparative static effects of the policy variables and show that lack of
information does affect many previous results concerning preemptive bribery.
4 Prior knowledge and Preemptive bribery
In the previous section, we have implicitly assumed that the probability, µ, of gathering hard
information or evidence is independent of whether the supervisor is knowledgeable about the
firm’s type or not. This assumption is present in different forms in much of the literature. In
many models (i.e. Mookherjee and Png 1995), all information is hard information and hence
there is no difference between detection of types and evidence gathering. In models where
a distinction between hard and soft information is made (i.e. Samuel 2009), the supervisor
always knows the types but to gather hard information (or what we have also referred to
as evidence) the supervisor needs to incur positive cost. In contrast, here the supervisor
does not know the types initially but it can learn about the types without (and before)
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collecting evidence.17 The key question here is: does prior knowledge of the types make it
easier to collect evidence? We believe that in many settings it does. For example, a suspect
in a criminal trial may admit to the crime. Often this admission of guilt is inadmissible in
court, nevertheless this knowledge can make it easier for a detective to find evidence against
the suspect. Similarly, it is common for an investigative journalist to know of a particular
political scandal (perhaps because the knowledge is obtained through “unnamed sources”),
and this knowledge can make it easier for the journalist to obtain evidence regarding this
scandal.
In this present context, any separating bribe offer must reveal something about the firm’s
type since each type of firm offers a different bribe. Although this information may not be
hard, this knowledge of firm’s types will make it easier for the supervisor to obtain evidence
regarding the firm’s type.18 We formalize the concept that knowledge translates into more
effective evidence gathering through the following Prior Knowledge Condition.
Prior Knowledge Condition: Suppose the supervisor believes the firm to be of a
certain type with probability one, the probability (µ/) of obtaining hard information against
this particular type, upon exerting effort E, is always higher than the probability (µ) of
obtaining hard information against a type of firm that the supervisor is not sure about.
It is important to note that this condition is not meant to be a refinement criterion (like
D1), rather it modifies the actual game being played by the supervisor and the agent. Hence,
we denote the game with prior knowledge by GK . Additionally, in this game, the supervisor
does not commit to not using the information gained during the bribe negotiation. However,
once it receives a bribe from the firm, the supervisor commits not to investigate, as in the
previous section.
In this game, the expected payoffs to the supervisor and the agent following a rejection
of bribe offer are affected by this condition. When the supervisor is faced with a bribe
offer which tells him that it has to be from a certain type, its expected payoff goes up
because he is able to gather evidence with a higher probability. Note that this applies
uniformly across the types, irrespective of whether it is l or h. In this section we require
17It is quite common for agents, in various economic settings, to learn or know through communication,
signalling and different methods of inference.
18Alternatively, one could assume that the belief that an individual is a high polluter (with probability
1) encourages the supervisor to exert more effort, because she knows she will find evidence. This is not
technically feasible in our model because effort is discrete. However, if effort were continuous, this alternative
assumption would yeild similar results.
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that the equilibrium outcome should satisfy the prior knowledge condition. In other words,
we require that µ′ = µ(1) > µ(q), for q < 1. While our results hold for any µ′ such that
µ′r > µ, for simplicity we assume that µ′ = 1.19 Note that previously, the h types were always
able to separate from the other type and engage in preemptive bribery. But now there is
a trade-off, because once revealed, the expected rewards to the supervisor will be higher
and the minimum bribe required to engage in preemptive bribery will be correspondingly
higher. Thus, the prior knowledge condition introduces a cost to the h type for choosing
a (separating) bribe that reveals its type. This cost creates a disincentive for preemptive
collusion. The following proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 4 Suppose r ≥ r′. In the prior knowledge game, the no-collusion outcome can
be implemented as the unique equilibrium if the fine for the h type can be raised sufficiently.
Proof. Note that we continue to assume r ≥ r′ so that ex post collusion is always pre-
vented. First, we show that the no-collusion (NC) outcome can be an equilibrium. Consider
the equilibrium strategy profile,
σ∗NC : B
∗
l = 0, B
∗
h = 0, ρ
∗(B) = 0,∀B ≤ rFh − E. (10)
The corresponding belief system is given by,
q˜NC(B) =
{
p, B = 0
0, B > 0.
(11)
It is easy to verify that (σ∗NC , q˜NC) is an equilibrium if µFh ≤ rFh − E. By not entering in
to a preemptive bribery deal, the firm faces full penalty Fh, but with a reduced probability
µ < 1. With preemptive bribery, given KC, it has to pay a higher bribe rFh − E. In the
absence of PKC, the minimal separating offer by the h type is µrFh−E, whereas with PKC
this goes up to rFh − E. Hence, to guarantee the existence of this equilibrium we need,
r ≥ µ+ E
Fh
, or Fh ≥ E
r − µ.
20 (12)
To see that preemptive bribery cannot be sustained, consider the separating and pooling
19Further, note that if µ′r < µ, then the equilibrium results of Proposition 3 would apply.
20The corresponding case when µ
′
< 1 will be Fh ≥ Eµ′r−µ .
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equilibria discussed earlier. The h type will prefer to be inspected if condition (12) is satisfied,
rFh − E > µFh, which reduces to (r − µ)Fh > E. Thus we cannot have any separating
equilibrium of the type discussed in 3.2.
Now consider the pooling equilibria with positive bribes. In any pooling equilibrium
bribery does not reveal any information about the firm’s type, hence q = p. Therefore, for
the supervisor to accept the pooling bribe B∗ with positive probability, it must satisfy:
B∗ ≥ µr[pFl + (1− p)Fh]− E.
This bribe must also be individually rational for the low types, therefore,
B∗ < µFl.
Combining the two previous inequalities, it follows that a pooling equilibrium with preemp-
tive bribery can exist only if
µ[(rFh − Fl − rp(Fh − Fl)] < E. (13)
Hence, pooling equilibria (described in the Appendix (17)) can be eliminated if the above
inequality if (13) is reversed, that is,
Fh ≥ F /h , where F /h is given by µ[(rF /h − Fl − rp(F /h − Fl)] = µFl. (14)
Hence, the no-collusion equilibrium is unique for Fh ≥ max{F /h , Er−µ}.
This shows that a combination of high rewards for the supervisor and high fines for the
h type firms can deter both forms of collusion. Our analysis relied heavily on the regulator’s
ability to set Fh at a sufficiently high level. This may not be feasible for various reasons, for
example, fines might be subject to some limited liability constraints.
5 Policy Analysis
In this section we study the comparative static effects of policy parameters r, Fi, E, and µ.
We show that incomplete information (both with and without the prior knowledge condition),
affect previous comparative static results in the literature regarding preemptive bribery. We
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assume that any of these comparative static changes always satisfy the restrictions imposed
on these parameters in section 2.
Proposition 5 The comparative static effects of the policy parameters in the three games:
full information, incomplete information without the prior knowledge condition, and incom-
plete information with the prior knowledge condition are as follows.
• Full information game (GC): A small increase in r, Fi, E, and µ has no impact on the
incidence of bribery or the likelihood of prosecution of either type of firm. However, an
increase in r, Fi, µ increases the size of the preemptive bribe, while an increase in E
decreases the size of the preemptive bribe. However, none of these parameters can be
chosen in a way to eliminate preemptive bribery.
• Incomplete information, no prior knowledge (GA): In the unique equilibrium that sat-
isfies D1, the following comparative statics hold. A small increase in r, Fh and µ
increases the likelihood of prosecution of the l types, and a small increase in E or Fl
decreases the likelihood of prosecution of the l types. The likelihood of prosecuting the
h types is unaffected by any of these parameters. However, for any of these policy
parameters, preemptive bribery will always occur for the h types and sometimes for the
l types.
• Incomplete information, with prior knowledge (GK): A small increase in µ increases
the likelihood of prosecution of both types. But none of the other parameters have
any effects on the equilibrium likelihood of prosecution. Further, there exist policy
parameters for which preemptive can be eliminated entirely.
Proof. First, consider the game with full information. As we have seen in the Claim in
Section 2, bribery can never be eliminated. The rest of the comparative static results follow
from observing that U∗i = −[µrFi − E].
Second, consider the game with incomplete information, but without the prior knowledge
condition (Section 3). First note that, without the knowledge condition, preemptive bribery
cannot be prevented even with higher µ and lower E, since µFh > µrFh − E even when E
is close to 0, (because r < 1). Second, from the expression for x in Proposition 3, we can
verify that ∂x
∂r
< 0, ∂x
∂µ
< 0, ∂x
∂Fl
> 0, ∂x
∂E
> 0 and ∂x
∂Fh
< 0. Since the probability of prosecution
is simply (1−x), the claim in the proposition easily follows. Finally, as proposition 3 shows,
preemptive bribery always occurs for the h types and sometimes for the l types.
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Third, consider the game with the prior knowledge condition (proposition 4). We know
that preemptive bribery can be eliminated entirely. The comparative static results follow
directly from this. That is, µ is the only parameter that can affect the likelihood of prose-
cution. However, note that the prior knowledge condition makes a significant impact only
when µ is not too large. As µ is raised preemptive bribery becomes more attractive and it
may not be possible to guarantee the no-collusion outcome.
Proposition 5 identifies the key impact of information with regard to the ability to fight
corruption using rewards versus sticks. As discussed previously, being able to use only carrots
to eliminate bribery is important because penalties for bribery simply create more opportu-
nities for bribery, whereas this problem does not arise if the regulator can eliminate bribery
only through carrots. Prior results in the literature show that ex-post bribery can always
be eliminated through rewards r but preemptive bribery cannot be eliminated through car-
rots alone. Under complete information this still holds true. Under incomplete information
without the prior knowledge condition preemptive bribery can only be partially eliminated
through the use of carrots alone. However, in the game with the prior knowledge condition,
preemptive bribery can be completely eliminated through the use of only carrots (as long
r satisfies equation (12)). Thus, what matters for the elimination of bribery only through
carrots is not simply the lack of information, but rather whether that information translates
into better investigative abilities for the supervisor. Or interpreted alternatively, whether or
not the supervisor can commit to not use the information she learns about the firm (from
the bribe offer) in any subsequent investigations, should that bribe negotiation break down.
The above comparative static results are also interesting relative to those discussed in
Bag (1998), Samuel (2009). Specifically, in these papers when preemptive bribery occurs
under full information, an increase in the supervisor’s ability to monitor (µ), an increase in
cost of evidence gathering E, and an increase in the penalty F always increase the likelihood
of preemptive bribery. In contrast, with incomplete information an increase in µ reduces
the likelihood of preemptive bribery among low types (by lowering x), while not affecting
the incentives for bribery among the high types. However, an increase in E raises x thereby
increasing the frequency of preemptive bribery among the low types. Further the fines have
opposing effects in that an increase in Fl increases the incidence of bribery among l types,
whereas an increase in Fh decreases preemptive bribery among l types, but neither of these
fines impact the likelihood of bribery among h types.21 As Fl is raised, Bl also goes up leading
21This also opens up the possibility that the regulator might impose different fines for firms even when
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to increased chances of the bribe offer being accepted by the supervisor, while keeping the
incentive compatibility condition for the h type satisfied.
The comparative static effects of µ and E are particularly important from a policy stand
point because they offer insight as to whether improvements in technology can reduce the
incentives for bribery. Bac (1998) and Bag (1997) show that an improvement in the super-
visors’ ability to monitor the firm can manifest itself in the form of lower effort costs E (for
a given level of monitoring µ), or an increase in supervisor’s ability to monitor the firm µ for
a given level of effort. They show that these two effects are asymmetric. That is, a decrease
in the cost of monitoring E always discourages preemptive bribery, while an increase in µ
encourages it. In contrast, here in the game without the prior knowledge condition, an im-
provement in the supervisors monitoring technology (either through a reduced E or higher
µ) always reduces the frequency of preemptive bribery among l types. Thus, in contrast
to these previous papers who argue that improvements in the monitoring technology may
not be desirable since they encourage bribery, here we show that in the presence of asym-
metric information, improvements in monitoring technology are always be desirable. Thus,
the results regarding the incentives for preemptive bribery (even in the absence of the prior
knowledge condition) stand in sharp contrast to those in the existing literature.
A final policy issue remains. Thus far, we have looked at the interactions between the
firms and the supervisor, taking the enforcement regime to be given. Further, the fraction of
l and h types was exogenous. However, the regulator can potentially choose fines, rewards,
and investigation intensity optimally. These fines will in turn affect the fraction of firms
that belong to each type. While a formal treatment of this regulatory problem is beyond
the scope and focus of this paper, we now sketch an extension to discuss the implications of
our paper for compliance and optimal policy.
We consider an extension of our model in the spirit of Shavell (1992). There are a finite
number of equally likely types t = 1, 2.....T . Each type can choose whether to pollute 0, l, or
h, where type t receives a benefit of tgi for i = {0, l, h}, gh > gl.22 This framework essentially
follows Shavell’s “two-act model” of marginal deterrence, therefore, his result follows that a
socially optimal planner will set Fh > Fl.
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they generate the same social harm, in order to create artificially distinct types.
22This choice structure essentially makes the types in our model (Section 2) the “derived” types.
23For example, if T = 2, it can be shown that Fl =
glF
max
2gh−gl , Fh = F
max, where the maximal fine Fmax
depends on the legal limits on fine or wealth constraints of firms. It can be checked that the relevant
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Turning to endogenous compliance and bribery. Pollution decisions will depend on the
gains from polluting (level i) and the expected cost associated with it (U∗i ). For example, a
firm of type t will choose no pollution to l if tgl−µFl ≥ 0. Thus, all firms with t ≤ µFlgl ≡ tl will
choose not to pollute. Similarly, a firm of type t will choose l over h if tgl−µFl ≥ tgh−µFh.
That is, all firms with t ≥ µ(Fh−Fl)
gh−gl ≡ th choose h. Thus, all types t ≤ tl will choose not
to pollute, tl < t ≤ th will pollute l and t > th will pollute h. In the absence of corruption
the fraction of firms choosing zero pollution is µFl
Tgl
, fraction of firms choosing high level of
pollution h is 1− µFh
Tgh
and the remaining fraction choosing low pollution. In this equilibrium
since bribery affects the expected cost associated with any pollution level, the fraction of firms
for each level of pollution will be affected by bribery. Specifically, with preemptive collusion,
payoffs are tgl−[µrFl−E] > tgl−µFl, tgh−[µrFh−E] > tgh−µFh. Clearly, tl, th will be lower
with preemptive collusion, therefore, there is less compliance. With incomplete information,
expected payoff from high pollution stays the same, but the payoff from low pollution is lower
because low pollution firms get prosecuted with some probability and their expected payoff is
tgl−[x(µrFl−E)+(1−x)µFl] > tgl−µFl, where x < 1 and µrFl−E < µFl. Compared to the
full information preemptive bribery case, now there are more firms choosing zero pollution
(and not bribing) and tl is higher. Thus, incomplete information does reduce bribery.
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Under prior knowledge the impact of incomplete information is further strengthened because
bribery is eliminated completely, therefore, compliance returns to the original (no corruption)
levels of th and tl.
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6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to understand the possible limits that incomplete information places
on the incentives and scope for preemptive bribery. We show that the incentives for preemp-
tive bribery are strongly influenced by the presence of asymmetric information. However, the
degree of influence depends on whether the prior knowledge of a firm’s type makes it easier
to collect evidence. To reflect this possibility we introduce the prior knowledge condition,
incentive constraints 2gh − µFh ≤ 2gl − µFl ≤ 0, and gl − µFl ≤ 0, gh − µFh ≤ 0 are satisfied and µ is
minimized.
24For the example in footnote 16, the low types expected payments change from 7 to 13.8. The high types
continue to pay 16
25Note that in a pooling equilibrium the prior knowledge condition does not apply. Hence the results of
Proposition 4 with regard to pooling can be applied.
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which states that the supervisor’s probability of gathering hard information regarding the
firm’s waste level is higher when the supervisor has prior knowledge of the firm’s waste level
(type). This condition introduces a cost to the informed party for choosing a separating
strategy in a signaling game, which as we show is critical.
In the absence of the prior knowledge condition, asymmetric information prevents pre-
emptive bribery, but only to a limited extent. Specifically, with incomplete information h
type firms always engage in preemptive bribery while l type firms do so with some probability
and are prosecuted the rest of the time (proposition 3). Thus, an outcome in which neither
type (ever) engage in bribery cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. However, relative to
the case with full information (in which bribery always occurs), incomplete information does
limit bribery, at least among low polluting firms.
With the prior knowledge condition, knowledge obtained through the bribing process
makes evidence gathering more effective. Consequently, the h types’ incentive to separate
and engage in preemptive bribery now comes at a cost, and the minimum bribe required to
separate is significantly higher under the prior knowledge condition. Thus, in contrast to the
case without the prior knowledge condition, informational constraints completely eliminate
preemptive bribery under certain reasonable conditions. 26
Although we have focused on the implications of the prior knowledge condition for bribery,
this condition can be applied to a variety of situations. For example, it may apply to
settlement and litigation within the context of tort suits, where the defendant but not the
plaintiff knows the true extent of the damages. Our model suggests that when the prior
knowledge condition applies, then pre-trial settlements are less likely to occur, in contrast
to what standard models predict (Reinganum and Wilde 1986).27 Relatedly, the preemptive
bribe negotiation is similar to the negotiation between a defendant and a prosecutor (or
district attorney) because this negotiation also occurs before the prosecutor has gathered all
the evidence. Our model with the prior knowledge condition may also explain the behavior
of defendants within the context of plea bargaining offers. However, we leave the application
of our condition in these areas for future work.
26However, it should be noted that whether the prior knowledge condition is valid will depend on the
specific context in which preemptive bribery occurs.
27A key difference, however, is that in our model the inspector can commit to not investigate, whereas,
this commitment may not always be possible in some legal contexts.
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7 Appendix
In the following paragraphs we examine the various equilibria discussed in the text to see
whether the out-of-equilibrium beliefs specified by these equilibria are deemed reasonable.
As mentioned in the text, we adopt the Universal Divinity criterion as characterized in
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and refer to it as condition D1. Before proceeding to apply
this criterion to the equilibria described in section 3, the set of equilibria can be characterized
as follows. We have three types of equilibria, as we explain below. It must be pointed out
that we are restricting attention to pure strategy bribe offers only, it is possible to have other
equilibria with mixed offers.
1. If (µrFh−E)−µFl > µrp(Fh−Fl) > 0, then we have two types equilibria. (A) First,
there is a separating equilibrium (discussed 3.2) where B∗l = 0 and B
∗
h = (µrFh − E) and
ρ∗(B) = 1∀B ≥ B∗h, 0 otherwise. (B) Second, we (always) have the separating equilibrium
of Proposition 3; B∗l = µrFl − E and B∗h = (µrFh − E) and ρ∗(B) = 1∀B ≥ B∗h,&ρ∗(B) =
x < 1, B = B∗l , 0 otherwise.
2. If µrp(Fh−Fl) > (µrFh−E)− µFl > 0, we have three types of equilibria, (A), (B) &
(C). In addition to the above two we also have a (C) pooling equilibrium B∗i = B
∗, i = l, h,
B∗ ≥ µr[pFl + (1− p)Fh]− E, ρ∗(B) = 1∀B ≥ B∗h, 0 otherwise.
3. If µrFh − E ≤ µFl then we have only two types of equilibria, (B) and (C).
In the text we have shown that separating equilibrium (B) satisfies D1 (Proposition 3),
here we show that equilibria (A) and (C) do not satisfy D1.
Separating Equilibrium (A)
Suppose µrFh − E > µFl. Define B∗l = 0 and B∗h = (µrFh − E). It can be shown that
there exists a strategy profile σ∗ and system of belief q˜ such that (σ∗, q˜ ) is a sequential
equilibrium. The strategy profile σ∗ is given by,
B∗l = 0, B
∗
h = µrFh − E (15)
ρ∗(B) =
{
1, ∀B ≥ B∗h
0, otherwise.
The corresponding belief system q˜ is given as follows:
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q˜(B) =
{
1, B = 0
0, otherwise.
(16)
The supervisor believes that any positive bribe offer must be from the h type. Given this
belief, the supervisor will not accept any bribe which is less than µrFh−E. This is the payoff
the supervisor gets from rejecting a bribe offer when faced with the h type firm. The l types
pay no bribe and face investigation and do not benefit from deviating given the beliefs and
strategy of the supervisor. Equilibrium payoffs of the two types are U∗h = −[µrFh−E], U∗l =
−[µFl]. Consider a deviation to bribe B > rFl − E. Recall that any offer below this will
always be rejected. Type h would deviate to B if ρB+(1−ρ)µFh < µrFh−E where ρ is the
probability that B will be accepted. Hence D(B, h) = {ρ ∈ P | ρ > ρh = µFh+E−µrFhµFh−B < 1}.
For the l type, deviation to B is profitable if and only if ρB + (1 − ρ)µFl < µFl. Hence
D(B, l) = {ρ ∈ P | ρ > 0}. Clearly, D(B, h) ⊂ D(B, l), therefore, the l type is more likely
to have deviated to B. The out-of-equilibrium belief q(l | B > 0) = 0 is not consistent with
D1.28
Note that we do not have separating equilibria of this type when µrFh − E ≤ µFl. The
only separating equilibrium in such a case is the one discussed Proposition 3.
Pooling Equilibrium (C)
Suppose µrp(Fh − Fl) > (µrFh − E) − µFl. As claimed above, we can show that
there exists a strategy profile σ∗, and system of belief q˜, such that (σ∗, q˜ ) is a sequential
equilibrium. This strategy profile is,
B∗i = B
∗, i = l, h, V R(p) ≤ B∗ (17)
ρ∗(B) =
{
1, ∀B ≥ B∗
0, ∀B < B∗,
where V R(p) = µr[pFl + (1− p)Fh]−E. The system of beliefs q˜ supporting this equilibrium
is given by,
28While we specify these particular beliefs, any out of equilibrium bribe B ∈ (0, µrFh − E) along with a
sufficiently low belief q˜(B) < µrFh−E−Bµr(Fh−Fl) also supports this equilibrium. However, a similar argument can be
used to show that these beliefs do not satisfy D1. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for recognizing
this possibility.
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q˜(B) =

p,B = B∗
0,∀ V R(p) < B < B∗
p,∀ B ≤ V R(p).
(18)
It can be verified that ρ∗(B) is optimal given q˜. Both types offering bribe B∗ is also optimal
given ρ∗. The system of belief given by q˜ above is also consistent.
Let µrFh − E ≤ µFl, note that this is a sufficient condition for the pooling equilibrium
to exist. Consider the pooling equilibrium with B∗h = B
∗
l = B
∗ = µr(pFl + (1− p)Fh)− E.
This is the smallest possible equilibrium bribe in a pooling situation. Consider a deviation
to bribe B, µr(pFl + (1− p)Fh)− E > B > µrFl − E. Equilibrium payoffs of the two types
are U∗h = U
∗
l = −B∗. As we have done previously, here also we can find the set of mixed
best responses by the supervisor so that deviation by the firm would be profitable. It is easy
to check that D(B, h) = {ρ ∈ P | ρ > ρh = µFh−B∗µFh−B < 1} and D(B, l) = {ρ ∈ P | ρ > ρl =
µFl−B∗
µFl−B < 1}. Once again, D(B, h) ⊂ D(B, l) implying that type l is more likely to have
deviated. This is not consistent with the out-of-equilibrium beliefs required to sustain the
pooling equilibrium. Similar arguments can be applied to other pooling equilibria.
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